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Abstract 
Can trade liberalization shape sector dynamics by inducing reallocation of resources towards 
more efficient use? This paper explores whether and how import competition affects 
productivity dispersion within 425 4-digit manufacturing industries in China. Using a number 
of comprehensive micro-level datasets over the period of 2000-06, we find that import 
penetration reduces the productivity dispersion in general and the main channel is through the 
competition-induced dynamic resource allocation within industries by driving the least 
efficient firms out of the market. The trade-induced productivity truncation is more evident 
for imports under the ordinary trade regime and for final imported goods and intermediate 
goods imported by the same industries. The results are robust to various model specifications 
and estimation methods. 
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1. Introduction 
Cross-sectional dispersion in firm-level productivity is not only commonly observed 
even within narrowly defined industries, but also varies considerably across countries at 
different stages of economic development. For instance, Syverson (2004) discovers that 
within four-digit SIC industries in the US manufacturing sector, the average total factor 
productivity (TFP) ratio between an industry’s 90th and 10th percentile plants is 1.921, 
indicating that the plant at the 90
th
 percentile of the productivity distribution makes almost 
twice as much output with the same measured inputs as the 10
th
 percentile plant. Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) find even bigger within-industry productivity dispersion in two large 
developing countries, i.e. the corresponding figures of average 90-10 TFP ratios in China and 
India are over 5:1.  
Productivity dispersion is economically relevant, to the extent that it reflects 
movements away from an optimal feasible resource allocation (Asker et al., 2014). The large 
and persistent productivity dispersion across firms may suggest certain market distortion that 
impedes the efficient allocation of resources, and therefore has significant economic and 
welfare implications. For instance, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) conduct a static cross-country 
comparison and claim that if manufacturing firms in China and India are able to achieve the 
same efficiency in allocating capital and labour across production units as does the US (by 
moving China and India to the US dispersion of marginal products), then the corresponding 
aggregate TFP gains can be up to 30-50% in China and 40-60% in India.  
On the other hand, looking at China itself from a dynamic view, the picture is less 
pessimistic. Figure 1 plots the distribution of TFP of Chinese manufacturing sectors for the 
years of 1998, 2003 and 2007
2
. We can see that over time there is not only a trend of rising 
central tendency in Chinese industry’s productivity distribution, but also a lower degree of 
dispersion, i.e. the left tail of TFP distribution in 1998 is far thicker than that in 2003 and 
2007. The increase in the mean or median of the productivity distribution and the decrease in 
the dispersion of productivity (as indicated by the truncation from the lower end of the 
productivity distribution) imply that a significant restructuring process has been at work in 
the Chinese manufacturing sector. Thus, a proper understanding of productivity dispersion 
and its determinants, and the relevant policies directed at reducing distortions or reallocating 
                                                        
1
 In Syverson (2004), the average difference in the natural logarithm of TFP between an industry’s 90 th and 10th 
percentile plants is 0.651, which corresponds to a TFP ratio of e
0.651
=1.92.  
2
 The data covers all the above-threshold manufacturing firms in China over the period 1998-2007. See detailed 
data description in Section 4.1.    
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resources is of paramount importance for such a large and transition economy like China. 
In this paper, we examine whether and how import competition affects the productivity 
dispersion within 425 4-digit Chinese manufacturing industries. Competition in output 
markets in general and trade-induced competition in particular are argued to be one of the 
strongest drivers that contribute to resource reallocation, and thereby affecting the within-
industry productivity dispersion. This argument is well supported by economic theories in 
international trade. According to Melitz’s (2003) model with heterogeneous firms, 
international trade can be viewed as a catalyst for inter-firm reallocations within an industry, 
i.e. the exposure to trade will induce the more productive firms to enter the export market and 
force the least productive firms to exit, so that the aggregate productivity increases due to 
selection and market share reallocation. Such mechanism works for imports as well. Melitz 
and Ottaviano (2008) find that in the short run import competition increases competition in 
the domestic product market, shifting up residual demand price elasticities for all firms at any 
given demand level, and thereby forcing the least productive firms to exit
3
. Surprisingly, 
empirical evidence in this literature is rather limited. Our research tends to fill this important 
gap and examines the distributional effects of trade openness on aggregate productivity, i.e. 
whether and how import competition helps to drive the least efficient firms out of the market, 
to induce dynamic resource allocation towards more productive firms, and therefore to reduce 
productivity dispersion within industry? To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study in 
the trade literature addressing the effect of import competition on within-industry 
productivity dispersion in China.     
There are at least three other important contributions of the paper. First, we aim to 
explicitly address the causality issue between import competition and productivity dispersion 
by using both the lagged level and the reductions in China’s import tariffs, and the lagged 
level of industry average of tariffs as instruments. Compared with the existing literature (see 
for instance, Syverson, 2004; Balasubramanian and Sivadasan, 2009) which assumes the 
exogeneity when modelling dispersion, our instrumental variable (IV) approach enables us to 
isolate the effect of import competition from other channels, and to tackle the potential 
problem of reverse causality running productivity dispersion to import penetration at the 
industry level.         
                                                        
3
 In the original Melitz (2003) model, import competition does not play a role in the reallocation process due to 
the CES specification for demand, i.e. residual demand price elasticities are exogenously fixed and unaffected 
by import competition. It is also worth noting that the short-run welfare gain from import competition in Melitz 
and Ottaviano (2008) may be overturned in the long run due to shifts in the pattern of entry.    
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Second, when modelling the impact of import competition on productivity dispersion, 
we capture the factors from both the supply side (such as the fixed costs and sunk costs of 
production), and the demand side (such as product substitutability). Besides, we take into 
account a number of China-specific factors, which play an important role in shaping the 
productivity distribution of Chinese industries (such as firm ownership, market structure and 
government subsidy). We are not aware of any existing study which attempts to capture all 
these three dimensions of factors when empirically modelling productivity dispersion. 
Third, although it is known in the literature that the Melitz-type mechanism would lead 
to reduction in standard deviation of productivity in general, the contribution of our work lies 
in identifying some of the potential mechanisms and channels through which imports affect 
productivity dispersion in China. For instance, we investigate the heterogeneous effects of 
imported goods according to their nature (final versus intermediate goods) and to the trade 
regime (ordinary versus processing trade). We also directly test whether the import-induced 
reduction in productivity dispersion is due to truncation from the bottom (by driving the least 
efficient firms out of the market) or convergence (by spurring the least efficient firms to 
improve their productivity). None of the existing work tends to explore the productivity 
implication of Chinese imports in such a systemic and comprehensive way. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 explains our empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the data and sample and 
presents some basic summary statistics. Section 5 interprets the results of our baseline model 
and of various heterogeneous effects and channels in order to shed light on whether and how 
imports affect productivity dispersion. Section 6 conducts further tests to examine the 
robustness of our results. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. Related literature 
We draw significantly on three strands of literature on productivity, i.e. the effect of 
trade liberalization on productivity, the productivity dispersion literature, and the effect of 
resource misallocation on aggregate productivity.  
First, there is a large literature showing that trade liberalization increases firm- and 
industry-level productivity (for instance, Melitz, 2003; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Fernandes, 
2007; Topalova and Kandelwal, 2011; Kasahara and Lapham, 2013; Yu, 2015). For instance, 
Kasahara and Lapham (2013) extend Melitz (2003)’s model to incorporate imports and claim 
that there are substantial gains in aggregate productivity and welfare due to trade. Based on 
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the Chilean plant-level data, their structural estimation highlights the role of importing 
intermediates for use in production in explaining differences in plant performance. Some 
recent empirical research examines the productivity gains from removing trade barriers and 
protections. Using Indonesian data, Amiti and Konings (2007) argue that reducing output 
tariffs can produce productivity gains by inducing tougher import competition, whereas 
cheaper imported inputs can raise productivity through learning, variety, and quality effects. 
Similar results are found for India and China by Topalova and Kandelwal (2011) and Yu 
(2015) respectively. 
Second, the fact that firms differ in performance or productivity ignites another 
interesting literature on productivity dispersion which focuses on the entire distribution of 
sector productivity and within-industry firm dynamics. Syverson (2004) examines the effect 
of a demand side factor, product substitutability, on productivity dispersion using US 
industry-level data. He argues that imperfect product substitutability impedes resource 
reallocation so that low-substitutability industries exhibit high productivity dispersion. 
Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009) focus on the effect of sunk costs on productivity 
dispersion, and find that increases in capital resalability are associated with a reduction in 
productivity dispersion.     
Third, there is a fast-growing literature which links the micro-level resource 
misallocation to aggregate productivity. Most works argue that the low aggregate TFP is a 
result of firm-/plant-level resource misallocation especially in developing countries, i.e. the 
most efficient firms fail to attract the large share of productive resources that efficiency 
would dictate (see, Olley and Pakes, 1996; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Foster et al., 2008; 
Heish and Klenow, 2009; Asker et al., 2014; Midrigan and Xu, 2014). Therefore reallocation 
of labour and capital across manufacturing firms is a key resource of productivity growth. In 
the case of China, apart from the seminal work by Heish and Klenow (2009) discussed earlier,  
Song et al. (2011) regard the initial misallocation as a pre-condition for China’s sustained 
growth because efficient firms can count on a highly elastic supply of factors attracted from 
the less productive firms. Khandelwal et al. (2013) empirically link trade and productivity 
through the resource reallocation channel and claim that trade barriers such as tariffs and 
quotas can distort resource allocation along the intensive and extensive margins. Focusing on 
Chinese textile and clothing exports, they find that quota removal coincides with substantial 
reallocation of export activity from incumbents to entrants, as well as a productivity gain by 
28%. Our paper is along these lines, but with some important new contributions as 
highlighted in the Section 1.    
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3. Empirical methodology  
3.1 Measures of TFP and productivity dispersion 
We construct the measure of firm-level TFP using the semi-parametric Olley and Pakes 
(1996) approach which alleviates both the selection bias and simultaneity bias (between input 
choices and productivity shocks). Another advantage of Olley-Pakes method is the flexible 
characterization of productivity, only assuming that it evolves according to a Markov process 
(Van Biesebroeck, 2007). Thus, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, the 
production function is  
                  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the natural logarithm of value added of firm i in industry j at time t, defined as 
sales minus intermediate inputs plus value added tax; 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
capital input, which is computed using the perpetual inventory method following Brandt et al. 
(2012); 𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the natural logarithm of firm’s labour input as measured by total employment; 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents a productivity difference known to the firm, but unobservable to us; and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is either measurement error or a shock to productivity which is not forecastable during the 
period in which labour can be adjusted.   
Our approach is based on the recent development in the application of the Olley-Pakes 
method (for instance, Amiti and Konings, 2007; Brandt et al., 2012; Feenstra et al., 2014). 
First, we use different price deflators for inputs, outputs and investment. It is known in the 
productivity literature that ideally one would use firm-specific price deflators when 
constructing TFP, otherwise the ‘omitted price bias’ may occur (see Van Beveren, 2012). 
Since such information is not available in the data, we use different industry-specific price 
deflators for inputs, outputs and investment, which are directly drawn from Brandt et al. 
(2012). This implies that our TFP measure is a revenue-based productivity measure (TFPR) 
as introduced by Foster et al. (2008), which may capture both technical efficiency and price-
cost markups. Second, we use the perpetual inventory method to compute the real investment 
variable, where the depreciation rate of physical capital is based on firms’ reported actual 
depreciation figure rather than arbitrary assumptions. Appendix Table A1 reports the 
estimated coefficients of the production function and the associated log of TFP by industry. 
The estimated output and labour elasticities with respect to output are all positive and 
significant, but the magnitude exhibits significant heterogeneity among industries. The 
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estimated TFP varies across industries too, with a 11 times difference between the most 
efficient sector (petroleum processing and coking) and the least efficient one (tobacco 
processing). We also find that most industries (19 out of 29) have exhibited decreasing 
returns to scale, which is consistent with the common findings in the literature (see, Brandt et 
al., 2012; Yu, 2015).   
Having obtained the firm-level TFP, we compute our measures of productivity 
dispersion. The primary productivity dispersion measure is the interquartile range (IQ range), 
i.e. the interquartile productivity difference divided by the industry’s median productivity 
level. One key advantage of IQ range is that it is less sensitive to the outliers. Alternative 
measures such as standard deviations in TFP (scaled by industry mean productivity), the 
difference between TFP at the 90
th
 and 10
th
 percentile of the distribution, and at the 95
th
 and 
5
th
 percentile of the distribution are also computed. To save space, we only report the results 
based on IQ range and standard deviations, and other results (which are quite similar) are 
available upon request.   
3.2 Baseline model specification and hypotheses  
The sources of productivity dispersion lie in both the supply-side-production factors 
such as technology shocks, management skill, R&D or investment patterns, and the demand-
side conditions such as product differentiation and substitutability. In particular, Syverson 
(2004) argues that when consumers can easily switch between producers, inefficient (high 
costs) producers cannot operate profitably. Hence, an increase in product substitutability 
raises the cutoff productivity level, thus lowering productivity dispersion. We follow this line 
of thinking and take into account both the demand- and supply-side factors affecting 
productivity dispersion in China. Besides, as a large developing country, China has a number 
of institutional features which need to be captured when examining the impact of import 
competition on productivity dispersion of Chinese industries.    
Our baseline model is specified as follows: 
  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑗𝑝𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜉𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗𝑝𝑡              (2)          
where the dependent variable is the productivity dispersion measure of industry 𝑗 and 
province 𝑝 at year 𝑡, which is defined by either the IQ range or standard deviations of 𝑇𝐹𝑃; 
𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 is the import penetration ratio which is defined as follows: 
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               𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 =
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑝𝑡
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑝𝑡+𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑗𝑝𝑡−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑝𝑡
                           (3)                                            
where 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑝𝑡 , 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑝𝑡  and 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑗𝑝𝑡  are total imports, exports and outputs of 
industry 𝑗 and province 𝑝 at year 𝑡. Import penetration ratio is argued to be a better proxy 
for trade liberalization than tariffs, as the latter does not take into account any non-tariff 
barriers of trade (Levinsohn, 1993). It is also worth noting that the province dimension is 
included in both the dependent variable and the key independent variable in order to reflect 
the geographic features that affect productivity distribution and international trade among 
industries in China
4
. This is consistent with the literature that local protectionism is prevalent 
in China which impedes the free flow of goods and services across provinces (Bai et al., 
2004). The relationship between trade liberalization and within-industry productivity 
dispersion is well predicted by Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), i.e. the 
benefits of exposure to foreign competition/markets enjoyed by the more productive domestic 
firms should drive the least efficient domestic producers out of business, thereby decreasing 
productivity dispersion. We therefore expect 𝛼1 to be significant and negative in equation 
(2).     
𝑋𝑗𝑝𝑡 consists of three groups of control variables, i.e. the demand-side factors, supply-
side factors, and China-specific factors. On the demand-side factors, following Syverson 
(2004), we use a vector of measurable proxies for substitution elasticities among the outputs 
of industry producers. The first measure, 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐿𝐵𝑗, represents a geographic barrier to 
substitution, which is the natural logarithm of the weighted sum of the dollar-value-to-weight 
ratios of all product classes in a given 4-digit industry j, where the weights are the product 
classes’ shares of the total industry tonnage shipped5. Geographic barriers to substitution arise 
when transport costs hinder producers from practically selling their output beyond certain 
distances. Therefore goods valuable in relation to their weight are more economical to ship. 
Industries with high values of 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐿𝐵𝑗  are expected to have less geographically 
segmented output market and greater substitutability. We therefore expect a significantly 
negative relationship between 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐿𝐵𝑗 and productivity dispersion.     
The other substitutability measure is advertising intensity (𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑗), which is defined as 
                                                        
4
 Our data contains the detailed information on the geographic location of trading firms, which is used to define 
the province of trade flows.  
5
 The transport data is from the US Bureau of the Census. We convert the SIC industry codes to corresponding 
GB (2002) industry level when merging it to the Chinese dataset. 
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total advertising expenditure in an industry j divided by total revenue
6
. The effect of branding 
and advertising on product substitutability is argued to be ambiguous. On the one hand, 
advertising may create artificial product differentiation so that industries with higher 
advertising intensities exhibit more product differentiation and less product substitutability; 
on the other hand, advertising is argued to be informative and serves to educate consumers 
about superior product, which allows more productive firms to take market share away from 
less efficient competitors. Hence we keep an open view on the coefficient of advertising 
intensity in the productivity dispersion equation. 
 We employ two variables to capture the supply-side factors, i.e. fixed operating costs, 
and sunk entry costs, both of which are expected to affect the critical productivity cutoff level 
and therefore the industry-level productivity dispersion. First, following Syverson (2004), we 
define the industry fixed cost index (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗) as the share of nonproduction workers in 
total employment in each Chinese industry j
7
. This measure is to proxy for the amount of 
overhead labour required by the industry technology and therefore the relative size of 
production-related fixed costs. It is argued that higher fixed costs make it difficult for 
inefficient firms to be profitable, leading them to exit in equilibrium. Thus we expect a 
significantly negative relationship between fixed costs and productivity dispersion at the 
industry level.  
Second, we adopt the method of Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009) to measure 
sunk entry costs (𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗), which is a capital resalability index defined as the share of 
used capital investment in total capital investment at each 4-digit industry j
8
. This measure of 
capital resalability is to capture recoverability of investments, which is an inverse proxy for 
the extent of sunkenness of capital investments. Compared with the standard method of 
Sutton (1991), where investments in physical capital (usually in the median plant size) are 
used to proxy sunk costs, the capital resalability index better accords with the theoretical 
definition of sunk costs where the resale value of investment should be strictly excluded.    
According to Hopenhayn (1992), sunk costs act as a barrier to entry and exit, and protect 
incumbent firms. Thus, an increase in sunk costs (as reflected by a decrease in capital 
resalability) leads to a reduction in the cutoff productivity, implying an increase in the 
productivity dispersion.   
                                                        
6
 The data is from Compustat, a database that has financial statement data on all listed US firms. We convert the 
3-digit SIC industry codes to corresponding GB (2002) industry level when merging it to the Chinese dataset. 
7
 Data come from various issues of China statistical yearbook. 
8
 The used capital expenditure data is from the US Bureau of the Census. We convert the SIC industry codes to 
corresponding GB (2002) industry level when merging it to the Chinese dataset. 
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We also include a number of China-specific factors which may affect industry-level 
productivity dispersion in the Chinese context. First, we include two ownership variables, 
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑗𝑝𝑡 and 𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑗𝑝𝑡, which are defined as the share of state-owned capital and foreign capital 
in total capital in 4-digit industry j in province p at year t respectively. It is widely believed 
that despite decades of economic reform, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain the least 
efficient sector in the economy with an average return on capital well below that in the 
private sector (Dougherty and Herd, 2005; Ding et al., 2012). On the other hand, foreign 
ownership is associated with both higher levels of TFP and fewer financial constraints 
(Manova et al., 2015). We hypothesize that both 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑗𝑝𝑡  and 𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑗𝑝𝑡 may increase 
productivity dispersion in the industry but from two different directions, i.e. the state 
ownership hinders the exit of least efficient firms therefore increasing the dispersion from the 
lower end of the distribution, whereas foreign ownership increases the top end of the 
productivity distribution and enlarges the dispersion from the right. 
Second, we construct the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑝𝑡) to capture the market 
structure or competition status in 4-digit industry j in province p at year t, where a lower 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 indicates higher degree of competition in the industry. The threat from competitors both 
intra- and inter-industry will affect resource allocation and then productivity dispersion 
(Syverson, 2011). Tougher domestic competition is argued to lower productivity dispersion, 
i.e. inefficient firms are hard to survive in a very competitive market.  
Third, government subsidy may affect the entry and exit of firms in the market, and 
therefore influence productivity dispersion in industries. Our subsidy measure (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑗𝑝𝑡) 
is defined as the ratio of subsidy to the value added of firms in 4-digit industry j in province p 
at year t. We expect a positive relationship between subsidy and productivity dispersion, as 
the government subsidy may keep the least efficient producers viable.  
Lastly, the error term in equation (2) comprises four components: (i) the time-specific 
fixed effect, 𝜂𝑡, accounting for possible business cycles and macroeconomic shocks such as 
an appreciation of the Chinese yuan; (ii) the province-specific fixed effect, 𝜁𝑝 , which 
captures geographic factors that influence productivity such as transportation costs, financial 
market development, tax treatment and so on; (iii) the industry-specific fixed effect, 𝜉𝑗,  
reflecting time-invariant industrial features affecting productivity such as factor costs and 
factor intensities; and (iv) an idiosyncratic error term, 𝜇𝑗𝑝𝑡, controlling for other unspecified 
factors.  
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3.3 Estimation methods  
The endogeneity problem is argued to be less serious when modelling productivity 
dispersion as firms do not observe the industry-level distribution information when making 
decisions. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the industry-province pairs with lower 
allocative efficiency or higher productivity dispersion may experience larger increases in 
import penetration due to the presence of lower-productivity domestic producers. 
Alternatively changes in demand conditions may influence both import penetration ratio and 
the productivity dispersion. We therefore adopt the IV approach in order to shed light on the 
causality between import competition and productivity dispersion in China. 
Three sets of instruments are used in our analysis. First, inspired by Yu (2015), we use 
the one-year lag of product-level output tariffs obtained from WTO as instruments for the 
import penetration ratio. The rationale is that past tariffs may be highly correlated with 
current tariffs and therefore affecting industries’ import penetration level, however they do 
not have any direct impact on the industries’ productivity dispersion. Second, the changes in 
tariff rates are used as another set of instruments since China was required to lower tariff 
rates systematically when it joined the WTO and the reductions were roughly proportional 
across products. Lastly, we use the one-year lag of similar industry tariffs, defined as the 
average of the rest of the 4-digit industry tariffs in the same 2-digit industry
9
, as the third 
group of instruments. The justification is that tariffs among similar industries are highly 
correlated, but lagged tariffs of other industries do not affect the productivity dispersion of 
the industry of interest. This method is inspired by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Lin et 
al. (2010) where industry average is used to instrument endogenous firm-specific variables. A 
number of diagnostic tests are then conducted to verify the quality of the three sets of 
instruments.  
4. Data and summary statistics 
4.1 Data and sample 
Our industry-level study is based on the aggregation of information from a number of 
comprehensive microeconomic datasets, including the firm-level production data drawn from 
                                                        
9
 For instance, one 2-digit industry ‘13’ has three 4-digit industries (‘1311’, ‘1312’ and ‘1313’). Then the 
instrument for 4-digit industry ‘1311’ is the lagged average of tariffs of the rest 4-digit industries ‘1312’ and 
‘1313’.   
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the annual survey of Chinese industrial firms by National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the 
transaction-level trade data from Chinese General Administration of Customs (GAC), the 
product-level tariff information published by World Trade Organization (WTO), and a 
number of US datasets (such as Compustat and US Bureau of the Census).  
The first firm-level dataset is drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by 
industrial firms with the NBS over the period of 1998-2007. This dataset includes all SOEs 
and other types of enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about $817,000) or 
more. These firms operate in the manufacturing sectors
10
 and are located in all 30 Chinese 
provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities 11 . Following the literature, we drop 
observations with negative total assets minus total fixed assets, negative total assets minus 
liquid assets, and negative sales, as well as negative accumulated depreciation minus current 
depreciation. Firms with less than eight employees are also excluded as they fall under a 
different legal regime (see, Brandt et al., 2012). Lastly, to isolate our results from potential 
outliers, we exclude observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables.  
The second database from the Chinese Customs contains detailed transaction-level 
information of all imports and exports in China during the period of 2000-06, which includes 
243 trading partners and 7526 different products in the 8-digit Harmonized System (HS). A 
feature of this dataset is its rich information on trade transactions. For instance, for each 
transaction it reports the transaction date, 8-digit HS product code, trade volume, trading 
partner, unit price, shipment method, trade regime and so on. To ensure the accuracy of the 
estimates, we eliminate the trading firms which do not engage in manufacturing but act as 
intermediaries between domestic producers/suppliers and foreign trade partners (see, Ahn et 
al., 2011; Manova and Zhang, 2012; and Yu, 2015). Merging the two datasets above gives us 
a final sample for the period of 2000-06, which has a good representativeness of exporting 
sector in China but is skewed toward large manufacturing firms
12
.  
Our tariff data is from WTO, which provides product-level tariffs at the 6-digit HS 
level of all WTO member countries/regions. Following Yu (2015), we use the average ad 
valorem (AV) duty in our empirical regression
13
. Lastly, when computing our measures of 
product substitutability, we use the US data for 3-digit SIC sectors from Syverson (2004) and 
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 We exclude utilities and mining sectors for our research purpose in this paper. 
11
 Our dataset does not contain any firm in Tibet.  
12
 The detailed merging technique and outcome of the first two datasets are available in Appendix 2. 
13
 China’s tariffs from 1998 to 2000 are missing from WTO, but we manage to get the 2000 tariff data from the 
Chinese Customs. We thank one referee for raising this point and Professor Miaojie Yu for sharing the data.  
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then match them to our GB (2002) industry level. Similarly, our measure of sunk costs is 
from US Bureau of the Census as in Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009). One benefit of 
using the US industry information is their strict exogeneity in our regressions.  
4.2 Summary statistics  
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of key variables in the baseline model. The 
average productivity dispersion measure based on the IQ range is 0.591 and the 
corresponding figure based on the standard deviation is 0.452. The import penetration ratio is 
averaged at 0.104 among all industries during the sample period. The two demand-side 
factors (𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐿𝐵 and 𝐴𝐷𝑉) and two supply-side factors (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) 
are industry-specific and time-invariant variables so that the sample size is 425 4-digit 
industries in China. The proportion of state-ownership (𝑆𝑂𝐸) and foreign-ownership (𝐹𝐼𝐸) is 
17.0% and 11.9% respectively in the sample. The market structure measure (𝐻𝐻𝐼) is 
averaged at 19.4% among Chinese industries. Lastly, government subsidy (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦) is 
averged about 0.4% of value added of firms. 
We provide further summary statistics at the industry level. Appendix Table A3(a) 
presents the productivity dispersion of 2-digit Chinese industries, where the dispersion 
measure is based on the IQ range
14
. There is significant cross-sectional heterogeneity of 
productivity dispersion among 2-digit industries. For instance, some oligopolistic sectors 
such as tobacco processing (1.159 in 2000) have much higher dispersion than the more 
competitive sectors such as textile (0.529 in 2000). In terms of time dynamics, we find that 
the productivity dispersion shows a decreasing trend for most industries over the sample 
period of 2000-06, indicating that the reallocation process plays a substantial role in the 
data
15
. Appendix Table A3(b) reports the import penetration ratio in 2-digit Chinese industrial 
sectors during the period of 2000-06. It is interesting to see that there exists vast 
heterogeneity among industries, where import penetration shows a rising trend in some 
industries (such as electronic machinery) and a decreasing trend in others (such as textile).  
In order to have a general idea on the relationship between import penetration and 
productivity dispersion, we aggregate the data and plot the relationship of these two variables 
during the period of 2000-06 in Figure 2. We find that the aggregate within-industry 
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 To save space, the productivity dispersion based on the standard deviation is not reported but available upon 
request. 
15
 Exception holds for four industries of leather, educational goods, petroleum processing and other 
manufacturing where productivity dispersion displays no significant change or a non-linear trend.  
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productivity dispersion in China decreases over time, whereas import penetration rises 
steadily during the sample period. Thus, an interesting research question arises: whether and 
how imports contribute to the reduction of productivity dispersion in China?       
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Baseline results 
Table 2 presents the results of our baseline model of equation (2) in order to shed light 
on whether import competition has an effect on industry-level productivity dispersion. The 
first stage IV results show that all three sets of instruments (lagged tariffs, first-differenced 
tariffs and lagged similar industry tariffs) have a significant and negative effect on the import 
penetration ratio. The second stage results confirm the exogenous role of imports in reducing 
within-industry productivity dispersion, i.e. a one percentage point increase in import 
penetration reduces the productivity dispersion by 0.3 percentage points (as measured by the 
IQ range, Column 4) or 0.2 percentage points (as measured by standard deviation, Column 8). 
This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that increased competition from trade could 
result in the truncation of within-industry productivity dispersion by inducing the dynamic 
resource allocation towards more efficient firms (see, Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz, 2003; 
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Our new results for China also correct the puzzle in Syverson 
(2004) where the effect of trade openness on productivity dispersion is absent.    
In terms of the measures of product substitutability, the coefficient of the dollar-value-
to-weight ratio (𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝐿𝐵) is significant and negative, which is in line with the theoretical 
hypothesis that higher geographic barrier to substitution reduces the cutoff productivity level, 
and thus increasing productivity dispersion. On the other hand, the advertising intensity (𝐴𝐷𝑉) 
has a significant and positive effect on productivity dispersion, indicating that greater 
artificial product differentiation reduces product substitutability and increases productivity 
dispersion. 
Fixed cost (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) is found to reduce productivity dispersion and to improve 
resource allocation, supporting the theoretical prediction that higher fixed costs can help to 
drive the inefficient firms out of the market, thus contributing to the reduction of productivity 
dispersion. The coefficient of sunk cost (𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) is also negative and significant. This is 
because the capital resalability index is an inverse proxy for the extent of sunkenness of 
capital investments. Sunk costs can impede competitive forces and prevent the attainment of 
15 
 
both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, as they make the act of exit costly and 
affect the discipline on incumbents. Our result confirms this argument. 
The results of all China-specific variables are in line with our expectation, where both 
state- and foreign-ownership (𝑆𝑂𝐸 and 𝐹𝐼𝐸) are found to have positive and significant 
effect on dispersion. We find that a more competitive market (lower 𝐻𝐻𝐼) is associated with 
better resource allocation and lower productivity dispersion. And the effect of government 
subsidy ( 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 ) on productivity dispersion appears to be positive and significant, 
indicating the adverse effect of government intervention on resource allocation and 
productivity distribution within industries.  
A number of diagnostic tests are conducted in order to verify the quality of the three 
sets of instruments. First, we use the under-identification test based on the Kleibergen-Paap 
rk LM statistics to check whether the excluded instruments are correlated with the 
endogeneous regressors. As shown in Table 2, the null hypothesis that the model is under-
identified is rejected at the 1 percent significance level. Second, the weak-identification test 
based on the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics provide strong evidence for rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the first stage regression is weakly identified at the 1 percent significance 
level. Third, we conduct the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity and our results reject 
the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous at 
either the 5 or 10 percent significant level, which justifies the use of IV approach for the 
estimation. Thus, our baseline model proves that import competition is an important means to 
reduce productivity dispersion within industries, and all control variables including supply-
side, demand-side and China-specific factors are important to determine the productivity 
dispersion in the way suggested by various theories discussed in Section 3.2.    
5.2 Heterogeneous effect: the role of trade regime 
We are interested in exploring some heterogeneous effects on how import competition 
affects productivity dispersion in China. One feature of China’s trade pattern is the sheer 
magnitude of processing trade
16
. According to Yu (2015), processing imports account for 
more than 50 percent of China’s total imports. There is a rising literature on the effect of 
different trade regimes on firm performance in China, which indicates that generally speaking, 
firms conducting processing trade have inferior performance than their counterparts who are 
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 Processing trade is officially defined as business activities in which the operating enterprise imports all or 
part of the raw or ancillary materials, spare parts, components, and packaging materials, and re-exports finished 
products after processing or assembling these materials/parts (Manova and Yu, 2012).  
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engaged in ordinary trade business (see, Jarreau and Poncet, 2012; Wang and Yu, 2012; Yu, 
2015; Manova and Yu, 2016). Following this line of thinking, we distinguish the 
heterogeneous effect of imports in various trade regimes and expect that the role of imports in 
reducing productivity dispersion in domestic industries is only evident for ordinary trade but 
not for processing trade.  
We use the trade regime information from the Customs dataset to classify all Chinese 
imports into two categories, i.e. ordinary- versus processing-trade imports. Then we compute 
the corresponding import penetration ratio for ordinary-trade imports (𝑂𝑇 − 𝐼𝑀𝑃) and that 
for processing-trade imports (𝑃𝑇 − 𝐼𝑀𝑃). The summary statistics (Appendix 6) indicates that 
the processing-trade import penetration ratio (0.046) is more than 4 times than the ordinary-
trade import penetration ratio (0.010), indicating the important role of processing trade in 
Chinese imports. The econometric results in Table 3 Panel A show that imports under the 
ordinary-trade regime have a significantly negative effect on productivity dispersion when 
both measures of productivity dispersion are used (Columns 2 and 5). However, the results on 
processing-trade imports are not statistically significant (Columns 1 and 4). Including both 
types of import penetration ratio into the regression simultaneously, we find that although 
both variables are significantly negative, the magnitude is much bigger for ordinary-trade 
imports than for processing-trade imports for both measures of dispersion
17
(Columns 3 and 6). 
The robust effect of ordinary-trade imports in our productivity dispersion regressions implies 
that only imports aiming for domestic markets are conductive to the reduction of productivity 
dispersion in domestic industries, whereas those imports aiming for exporting after local 
processing have no or very little resource reallocation effect on the domestic industries.  
5.3 Heterogeneous effect: the nature of imported products 
The effect of imports on productivity dispersion may depend on the nature of imported 
goods. On the one hand, imports of final goods
18
 lead to tougher competition in the domestic 
market, which forces firms to increase their efficiency, drives the least efficient domestic 
producers out of market and thereby reducing the productivity dispersion. This is often 
referred to as the pro-competitive effect of trade liberalization (see, for instance, Topalova and 
Khandelwal, 2011; De Loecker and Goldberg, 2013). On the other hand, openness to foreign 
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 The difference is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. 
18
 Final goods are the goods that are ultimately consumed by the consumers rather than used in the production 
of another good. 
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supply markets increases the availability of intermediate goods
19
 that may be cheaper or with 
a higher quality and technological content than domestic products (Maggioni, 2013; Halpern 
et al., 2015). In other words, trade liberalization brings in more and cheaper imported inputs, 
which can raise domestic firms’ productivity via learning, variety, and quality effect. This is 
referred to as the input effect which drives the productivity gains of individual firms, but not 
necessarily contributes to resource reallocation or reduction of productivity dispersion within 
industries.   
In order to test for such hypotheses, we firstly make the distinction between the final 
goods and intermediate goods by judging whether the imported goods are purchased by 
domestic manufacturing firms. Since manufacturing firms seldom engage in the retail 
business in China, the goods imported by manufacturing firms are intermediate goods for the 
production of final goods. On the other hand, we treat imports which are not purchased by 
manufacturing firms as final goods, which are directly purchased and consumed by 
consumers
20
. Then among the imported intermediate goods, we further distinguish between 
the intermediate goods which are imported by upstream industries
21
 and those imported by 
the same industries. The rationale for this further classification is that the same import flow of 
intermediate goods may represent a competitive threat for firms operating in that sector, but 
an opportunity for the downstream firms. Lastly, we compute the import penetration ratio for 
the final imported goods (𝐹𝐼𝑁 − 𝐼𝑀𝑃), for the intermediate goods imported by the upstream 
industries (𝑈𝑃 − 𝐼𝑀𝑃), and for the intermediate goods imported by the same industries 
(𝑆𝐴𝑀𝐸 − 𝐼𝑀𝑃). We expect that both the final imported goods and the intermediated goods 
imported by the same industries may reveal the pro-competitive effect, whereas the input 
effect can be dominant for the intermediate goods imported by upstream industries.  
Table 3 Panel B reports the results. We find the effect of import competition on 
productivity dispersion is significant and negative for both the final imported goods and the 
intermediate goods imported by the same industries, and the magnitude is greater for the 
latter. On the other hand, the effect becomes significantly positive for the intermediate goods 
imported by the upstream industries. This is in line with our expectation that the pro-
competitive effect of imports is well captured by the final imported goods, where the tough 
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 Intermediate goods are goods that are used as inputs in the production of final goods, such as partly finished 
goods.  
20
 Note that we exclude the trading firms that do not engage in manufacturing but act as intermediaries between 
domestic producers/suppliers and foreign trade partners in the Customs dataset. This is because it is not clear 
whether the imports purchased by them are for the production of final goods or for consumers.  
21
 Upstream industries are those processing the basic or raw material into intermediary products which are 
converted into finished products by the downstream industries. 
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foreign competition improves resource allocation and reduces productivity dispersion in 
domestic industries. The competition effect is also found for intermediate goods imported by 
the same industries, as such goods can compete with products in the same industry and 
generate learning effects from the foreign technology embodied in the imported intermediate 
inputs, which helps to reduce productivity dispersion. No competition effect is found for the 
intermediate goods imported by upstream industries, where international integration offers 
domestic downstream firms the opportunity to exploit an increase variety of intermediates 
with cheaper price or higher quality than domestic ones. Such input effect is not conducive to 
better resource allocation or reducing productivity dispersion.  
5.4 Channels: firm exit or convergence? 
In order to further shed light on how the restructuring progress has been at work in the 
Chinese manufacturing sector following the growing inflows of foreign imported goods, we 
directly test the following two hypotheses. First, is the import-induced reduction in 
productivity dispersion due to the truncation from the bottom by driving the least efficient 
firms out of the market and thus facilitating the dynamic resource allocation towards more 
productive firms? Second, is the effect due to convergence by spurring the least efficient 
firms to improve their productivity? Both mechanisms could potentially lead to the reduction 
of within-industry productivity dispersion but the way of achieving the aggregate trade-
driven productivity gains is different, i.e. the former can be viewed as the between-firm 
channel whereas the latter can be viewed as the within-firm channel.    
We first estimate an IV probit model to examine the factors that determine the 
probability of firm exit as follows. 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡+1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡    (4) 
where the dependant variable, 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡, is a dummy variable equal to one if firm 𝑖 in industry 
j exits at year t+1; 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 are the firm-level TFP and industry-level import 
penetration ratio as defined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2; and 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 include some firm-specific 
features such as firm age (𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡)
22
 and firm size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡)
23
, and some industry-specific 
features such as ownerships (𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑗𝑝𝑡 and 𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑗𝑝𝑡) and market structure (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑝𝑡) as defined in 
Section 3.2. The instruments used for the import penetration ratio are the same as those 
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 Firm age is defined as the difference between the current year 𝑡 and the opening year of the firm 𝑖. 
23
 Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡. 
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defined in Section 3.3.   
To test for the second hypothesis, we estimate the following model on firm-level TFP 
growth.  
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖 + 𝜁𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡     
(5) 
where the dependant variable, 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡, is the TFP growth rate of firm 𝑖 in industry j at year 
t; 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡−1is the lagged TFP level of firm 𝑖 to capture the convergence or catch up effect; 
𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 are exactly the same as those employed in equation (4). The error term in 
equation (5) comprises the time-specific fixed effect (𝜂𝑡), the firm-specific fixed effect (𝜉𝑖), 
the industry-specific fixed effect (𝜁𝑗) and an idiosyncratic error term (𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡). The two-stage IV 
approach is used to address the potential endogeneity of import penetration, using the same 
sets of instruments discussed in Section 3.3.  
Table 4 reports the results. In columns (1)-(3)
24
, we find that the effect of TFP on firm 
exit is significantly negative, i.e. the least efficient firms are more likely to exit the market. 
The industry-level import penetration tends to increase the probability of firm exit, but the 
effect is mitigated by firm’s TFP level as indicated by the negative and significant interaction 
term. This proves our first hypothesis that tougher import competition drives the least 
efficient firms out of the market. In columns (4)-(6), the negative and significant lagged TFP 
indicates that in general firms with initial lower TFP level tends to have a faster subsequent 
TFP growth due to the convergence or catch up effect. However, interestingly, import 
competition does not contribute to this process, i.e. import penetration itself has a significant 
and negative effect on firm-level TFP, and the negative effect is mitigated by firms’ TFP level 
as indicated by the positive interaction term. This rejects our second hypothesis that import 
competition spurs the least efficient firms to improve their productivity. Such evidence is also 
consistent with our earlier findings in Ding et al. (2016) that import competition stimulates 
domestic firms’ productivity growth only if firms and their industries are close to the world 
technology frontier, but discourages such growth for laggard firms and industries. 
Thus, our exercise provides some direct evidence for the resource reallocation effect of 
trade liberalization as suggested by Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Import 
competition forces the least productive firms to exit, induces dynamic resource allocation 
                                                        
24
 The coefficients reported in columns (1)-(3) are the marginal effects from the IV probit estimation. 
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towards more productive firms, and thereby reducing the productivity dispersion within the 
industry. Our results, however, do not support the argument that import competition increases 
the productivity of the least efficient firms in China.  
6. Further robustness tests 
We adopt a number of empirical methods to examine the robustness of our findings.  
To save space, we will only discuss the main findings of these tests, and all detailed results 
and summary statistics of new variables used in these tests are reported in Appendices 5 and 6.  
First, the quality of the productivity dispersion index is likely to be affected by the size 
of industries (Syverson, 2004; Balasubramanian and Sivadasan, 2009). For instance, 
industries with a small number of firms and monopolistic market structure tend to have lower 
productivity dispersion, which however cannot be interpreted as better resource allocation. To 
correct for this potential bias, we set the reciprocal of the number of firms as weights and run 
weighted regressions as a robustness test (Appendix Table A5(a)). Our main finding that 
import competition reduces the within-industry productivity dispersion remains intact.  
Second, one justification of our use of industry-province as the unit of observation, 
instead of just industry, is the prevalence of local protectionism in China, as found in Bai et al. 
(2004). To directly test for this hypothesis, we include the import penetration ratio of 
neighbouring provinces (Neighbour-IMP)
25
, along with the original IMP, into the regression. 
In Appendix Table A5(b), we find that the Neighbour-IMP has no impact on the within 
industry productivity dispersion of the province of interest, whereas its own IMP remains 
negative and significant. This provides further justification for our empirical methodology. 
Thirdly, we adopt a number of alternative methods to construct TFP in order to 
examine the robustness of our results on productivity dispersion. For instance, the 
productivity measure in Appendix Table A5(c) is based on Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
approach, where intermediate inputs are used to proxy unobserved productivity in order to 
address Olley and Pakes (1996)’s problem of lumpy investment. Secondly, Wooldridge 
(2009)’s approach is used in Appendix Table A5(d), which is a unified approach allowing for 
the possibility that the first stage of Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
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import penetration ratios of all neighbouring provinces for each province. One exception is Hainan province, 
which is an island and does not share any common borders with other provinces. We use Guangdong province 
as its neighbouring province which is geographically closest to Hainan province.    
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approach actually contains identifying information for parameters on the variable inputs. 
Lastly, TFP is estimated using a system GMM estimator in Appendix Table A5(e), where 
fixed effects are allowed to take into account firms’ (unmeasured) productivity advantages 
that persist over time. Our results remain robust when productivity dispersion is computed 
based on all these alternative TFP measures. 
7. Conclusion 
According to De Loecker and Goldberg (2013), the effect of trade liberalization on 
individual firms is important; however, what we care more about is how an industry, country 
or group of countries is affected by trade. Reallocation of economic resources from less 
towards more productive firms is one way in which industry- (or country) performance can 
increase even in the absence of any effects on individual firms. Thus, we follow this line of 
thinking by exploring the aggregate market reallocation effect of import competition rather 
than the efficiency improvement effect of individual firms in this study. 
Using a number of comprehensive microeconomic datasets, we examined the effect of 
competition pressure from foreign imports on productivity dispersion of Chinese industries.  
Controlling for the supply-side, demand-side and China-specific factors, we found that the 
import-driven truncation of productivity distribution is indeed present in 425 narrowly 
defined manufacturing industries in China. We then distinguished the heterogeneous effects 
for various types of imports and found that the role of imports in reducing productivity 
dispersion is more evident for ordinary-trade imports and for final imported goods and 
intermediate goods imported by the same industries. A direct test on the channels through 
which import competition affects industry-level productivity dispersion shows that the trade-
induced dynamic resource allocation within industries is achieved by driving the least 
efficient firms out of the market.  
Our research has some policy implications. By virtue of its market size and growth 
momentum, China is an important trade partner of most of the economies in the world. The 
robust demand from China on manufacturing products has contributed significantly to the 
global recovery from the recent financial crisis. Our research calls for the further reduction of 
trade barriers, which is not only conducive to the reduction of resource misallocation in 
China, but also has significant economic and policy impacts to the rest of the world. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of key variables in the baseline regression 
 Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable (productivity dispersion) 
TFP Dispesion (IQ Range)  16985 0.590  0.240  0.042  2.817  
TFP Dispersion (Std. Dev)  16985 0.452  0.137  0.033  1.783  
Independent variables      
IMP 16985 0.104 0.183 0.000 0.988 
VALUELB 425 0.052 0.132 0.000 1.200 
ADV 425 0.012 0.018 0.000 0.184 
Fixed Cost 425 0.298 0.104 0.098 0.654 
Sunk Cost 425 0.094 0.059 0.003 0.438 
SOE 16985 0.170 0.232 0.000 1.000 
FIE 16985 0.119 0.176 0.000 1.000 
HHI 16985 0.194 0.158 0.002 0.985 
Subsidy 16985 0.004 0.013 0.000 0.932 
Instruments 
Output tariffs 16985 14.629  10.315  0.000  69.500  
Changes of output tariffs 16985 14.348  7.942  0.455  52.500  
Similar industry tariffs 16985 11.116  2.756  0.000  45.000  
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Table 2. Baseline results: the effects of import competition on productivity dispersion 
Dispersion Measure 
IQ Range Standard Deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IMP -0.244*** -0.288*** -0.295*** -0.300*** -0.087* -0.132*** -0.138*** -0.154*** 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) (0.046) (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) 
VALUELB  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADV 0.007*** 0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Cost  -0.151*** -0.162*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.065*** -0.079*** -0.037** -0.038** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Sunk Cost -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.191*** -0.190*** -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.073*** -0.072*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
SOE  0.235*** 0.204*** 0.204***  0.183*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FIE  0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086***  0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
HHI   0.297*** 0.297***   0.301*** 0.301*** 
   (0.014) (0.014)   (0.007) (0.007) 
Subsidy    0.209*    0.254*** 
    (0.124)    (0.077) 
Under-identification test  728.678 
a 
712.990 
a 
710.401 
a 
703.147 
a 
728.678 
a 
712.990
a 
710.401
a 
703.147
a 
Weak identification test 282.000
 a
 280.469 
a
 280.186
 a
 277.110
 a
 282.000
 a
 176.202
 a
 280.186
 a
 277.110
a
 
Durbin Wu-Hausman test 6.320
 b
 8.851
 b
 9.641
 b
 10.030
 b
 3.838
 b
 2.940
 c
 3.872
 b
 4.502
 b
 
Adj-R
2
 0.051 0.084 0.116 0.115 0.082 0.149 0.256 0.255 
Observation 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 
First-Stage Regressions         
IV1: Lagged tariff level -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IV2: First-differenced tariff -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IV3: Similar-industry tariff -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The under-identification test is 
based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, with a null hypothesis that the model is under-identified; the weak 
identification test is based on the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with a null hypothesis that the first stage 
regression is weakly identified; and the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is based on the F statistics, 
with the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous; the superscripts 
a
 
b
 
and 
c
 are used to indicate that the p-value of the test statistics is below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively, 
suggesting that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected. In the first-stage regressions, IV1 reports the 
coefficients of the one-period lag of output tariffs, IV2 reports the coefficients of the changes of output tariffs, 
and IV3 reports the coefficients of the lagged similar industry tariffs. All province, year, and industry fixed 
effects are included but not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Heterogeneous effects: the role of import competition on productivity dispersion 
Dispersion Measure IQ Range Standard Deviation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. The role of trade regimes 
PT-IMP -0.012  -0.574* -0.009  -0.420*** 
 (0.010)  (0.340) (0.007)  (0.151) 
OT-IMP  -6.555*** -4.549*  -2.244** -2.374** 
  (2.293) (2.453)  (0.931) (0.914) 
Panel B. The nature of imported goods 
FIN-IMP -0.371***   -0.181***   
 (0.077)   (0.040)   
SAME-IMP  -0.554***   -0.283***  
  (0.137)   (0.071)  
UP-IMP   5.522***   2.242** 
   (2.072)   (0.896) 
Observation 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. OT-IMP is the import penetration 
ratio for ordinary-trade imports; PT-IMP is the import penetration ratio for processing-trade imports; FIN-
IMP is the import penetration ratio for imported final goods; SAME-IMP is the import penetration ratio for 
intermediate goods imported by the same industries; UP-IMP is the import penetration ratio for 
intermediate goods imported by the upstream industries; All other control variables and province, year, and 
industry fixed effects are included but not reported. See Appendix 4 for the full results of all the 
estimations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 4. Channels: the effects of import competition on firm exit and TFP convergence 
Dependent variables Firm Exit TFP Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TFP -0.089*** -0.025*** -0.024***    
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)    
TFP×IMP -0.082*** -0.097*** -0.104***    
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)    
LTFP    -0.759*** -0.894*** -0.894*** 
    (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
LTFP×IMP    0.280*** 0.288*** 0.293*** 
    (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) 
IMP 0.337*** 0.408*** 0.438*** -1.260*** -1.310*** -1.332*** 
 (0.079) (0.085) (0.094) (0.191) (0.184) (0.188) 
Size  -0.056*** -0.057***  0.482*** 0.482*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Age  0.014*** 0.015***  -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
SOE   -0.003**   0.000 
   (0.001)   (0.003) 
FIE   -0.009*   0.047*** 
   (0.005)   (0.009) 
HHI   0.020***   0.010 
   (0.005)   (0.009) 
Under-identification test 60.050 
a
 63.974 
a
 59.001 
a
 54.056 
a
 55.648 
a
 54.853 
a
 
Weak identification test 20.018 
a
 21.326 
a
 19.668 
a
 18.020 
a
 18.551 
a
 18.286 
a
 
Durbin Wu-Hausman test 15.312 
a
 16.108 
a
 22.454 
a
 17.367 
a
 17.776 
a
 18.399 
a
 
Adj-R
2
 0.127 0.139 0.142 0.098 0.101 0.113 
Observation 1329569 1284787 1284653 918285 912841 912756 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; TFP is the firm-level TFP; LTFP is 
the lagged firm-level TFP; IMP is the industry-level import penetration ratio; Size is the natural logarithm of 
firm’s total assets; Age is the firm age; SOE, FIE and HHI are defined in the same way as the baseline model. 
The coefficients reported in columns (1)-(3) are the marginal effect from the IV probit estimation. Firm, year 
and industry fixed effects are included in columns (4)-(6) but not reported to save space. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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Figure 1. TFP distribution in Chinese manufacturing industries (1998, 2003, 2007)  
 
 
Figure 2.  Import penetration and productivity dispersion in Chinese industries (2000-06) 
 
 
 
Notes: import penetration is defined as the ratio of imports to the sum of GDP plus exports minus imports 
using the data from China Statistical Yearbook from 2000 to 2006; productivity dispersion is defined as the 
Olley-Pakes TFP interquartile (IQ) range using the NBS firm-level data from 2000 to 2006. 
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Import competition, dynamic resource allocation and productivity dispersion: micro-level evidence from 
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Online Appendix 1. TFP estimation results 
Table A1. TFP Estimates using Olley-Pakes approach 
Industry code Industry name Capital Labour Returns-to-Scale TFP 
13 Food processing industry 0.464*** 0.497*** -0.039 2.390 
14 Food manufacturing industry 0.641*** 0.593*** 0.234*** 1.203 
15 Beverage manufacturing industry 0.628*** 0.481*** 0.109*** 1.616 
16 Tobacco processing industry 0.625*** 0.386*** 0.011 1.075 
17 Textile industry 0.403*** 0.415*** -0.182*** 3.201 
18 Clothing and other fiber products manufacturing 0.357*** 0.542*** -0.101*** 3.003 
19 Leather, fur, down and down products industry 0.344*** 0.504*** -0.152*** 3.251 
20 Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fiber and straw products industry 0.451*** 0.455*** -0.094*** 3.449 
21 Furniture manufacturing industry 0.429*** 0.681*** 0.11*** 2.166 
22 Paper and paper products industry 0.503*** 0.376*** -0.121*** 2.574 
23 Printing and record medium reproduction industry 0.814*** 0.396*** 0.21*** 1.453 
24 Educational and sports goods industry 0.259*** 0.523*** -0.218*** 3.189 
25 Petroleum processing and coking industry 0.351*** 0.355*** -0.294*** 3.500 
26 Chemical materials and chemical products manufacturing industry 0.458*** 0.362*** -0.18*** 2.638 
27 Pharmaceutical manufacturing industry 0.534*** 0.370*** -0.096*** 2.591 
28 Manufacture of chemical fibers industry 0.505*** 0.361*** -0.134*** 2.413 
29 Rubber product industry 0.472*** 0.392*** -0.136*** 2.492 
30 Plastic products industry 0.475*** 0.389*** -0.136*** 3.282 
31 Non-metallic mineral products industry 0.618*** 0.284*** -0.098*** 1.961 
32 Ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.466*** 0.459*** -0.075** 2.344 
2 
 
33 Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.382*** 0.434*** -0.184*** 3.332 
34 Fabricated metal products industry 0.425*** 0.440*** -0.135*** 2.751 
35 General machinery manufacturing industry 0.492*** 0.391*** -0.117*** 2.213 
36 Special equipment manufacturing industry 0.674*** 0.400*** 0.074** 1.902 
37 Transportation equipment manufacturing industry 0.631*** 0.507*** 0.138*** 1.775 
39 Weapons and ammunition industry 0.467*** 0.452*** -0.081** 2.215 
40 Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing 0.453*** 0.509*** -0.038 2.944 
41 Electronic and communication equipment manufacturing industry 0.528*** 0.418*** -0.054* 2.139 
42 Instrumentation and culture, office machinery manufacturing industry 0.353*** 0.469*** -0.178*** 3.346 
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients of the production function and the associated log of TFP by industry; the Returns-to-Scale column reports the sum of the 
capital and labour elasticities minus 1, and the result of Wald test of constant returns to scale is indicated by the significance level, i.e. if the value is statistically insignificant, 
then the null hypothesis of constant return to scale cannot be rejected; and if the value is significant and positive (negative), it indicates increasing (decreasing) returns to 
scale; industry code is the 2-digit Chinese Standard Industrial Classification (CSIC) code; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Online Appendix 2. Dataset merging information 
The difficulty of merging the NBS dataset and the Customs dataset lies in the absence 
of a common firm identifier shared by both datasets. We therefore rely on other firm 
characteristics such as firm name, telephone number, zip code, and firm address to achieve 
the best possible match of two datasets. Table A2(a) presents a brief summary of the datasets. 
We find that the number of exporting firms in the NBS dataset is much smaller than that in 
the Customs dataset
1
. There are two explanations for this discrepancy. First, most trading 
firms are quite small, so that they are not included in the ‘above-scale’ NBS dataset (Yu, 
2015). Second, the NBS dataset covers manufacturing firms only, whereas the Customs 
dataset consists of trading firms in all sectors in China such as manufacturing, agriculture, 
service, and so on. During the period of 2000-06, the number of exporting firms in our 
merged dataset accounts for 58.5% of total exporting firms in the NBS dataset on average. 
Table A2(b) and Table A2(c) provide the representativeness of our merged sample 
compared with the full-sample NBS data. Table A2(b) shows how much of total sales, exports 
and employment are accounted for by the merged data each year during 2000-06. On average, 
our merged data covers 44% of total sales, 74% of total exports and 36.4% of total 
employment in the firm-level NBS data. Table A2(c) shows that our merged sample has 
higher means of sales, exports and number of employees than the corresponding figures in 
the full-sample NBS data. These findings suggest that the merged sample is skewed toward 
large manufacturing firms in China. 
  
                                                        
1
 Note that although Customs dataset includes both imports and exports information, the NBS dataset contains 
firms’ exporting information only.  
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Table A2(a). Basic summary of datasets 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
NBS data 
a 
119,444 131,437 145,464 163,332 238,078 237,116 263,158 
##Export 36,908 40,128 45,040 50,616 76,607 74,395 77,723 
Customs data 
b 
81,995 89,660 104,245 124,299 153,779 179,666 208,425 
  ##Export 62,746 68,487 78,612 95,688 120,590 144,030 171,205 
##Import 62,750 67,588 77,303 87,934 102,242 113,456 121,835 
Merged data 
c 
25,712 29,615 33,918 39,020 56,937 57,058 60,999 
##Export 19,104 21,914 25,683 30,611 44,790 46,372 50,211 
##Import 18,094 20,041 22,700 25,787 36,943 36,332 38,102 
Merge Ratio 
d 
51.76% 54.61% 57.02% 60.48% 58.47% 62.33% 64.60% 
 
Notes: (a) the NBS firm-level dataset includes above-scale firms in the manufacturing sectors in China; it also 
reports firms’ export sales, but there is no information on imports; (b) Customs dataset contains detailed 
product-level information of international trade (both exports and imports) at the monthly level; we therefore 
aggregate such information to the firm-year level in order to merge it with the NBS dataset; (c) The merge of the 
two dataset is mainly based on the firm name, and other firm characteristics such as telephone number, zip code 
and firm address; (d) The merge ratio is computed as the number of exporting firms in the merged dataset in 
relation to the number of total exporting firms in the NBS dataset. 
 
 
 
Table A2(b). Firm-level production information in merged vs. full-sample NBS data by year  
Variables  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
Sales (%) 41.19 43.08 43.88 45.54 45.98 44.95 43.47 44.01 
Exports (%) 68.55 71.05 72.94 74.47 77.10 76.67 77.42 74.03 
Number of Employees (%) 30.31 33.05 35.15 37.29 39.14 39.94 39.90 36.40 
 
Notes: the value in this table represents the percentages of total sales, exports and employment of the merged 
data in the full-sample NBS data. 
 
 
 
 
Table A2(c). Comparison of the merged data and the full-sample NBS data  
Variables Full-sample data Merged data 
 
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Sales (RMB 1,000) 68717.90 5001 9993990 135093.9 5001 9987010 
Exports (RMB 1,000) 17196.51 0 1.52E+08 57453.14 0 1.52e+08 
Number of Employees 272.55 8 147722 455.8332 8 101375 
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Online Appendix 3. Additional summary statistics 
 
Table A3(a). Productivity dispersion in 2-digit Chinese industrial sectors (2000-06, based on the interquartile range) 
Industrial sectors 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Food processing industry 0.656  0.647  0.635  0.616  0.603  0.579  0.561  
Food Manufacturing industry 0.680  0.647  0.650  0.651  0.648  0.642  0.631  
Beverage Manufacturing industry 0.838  0.834  0.801  0.790  0.795  0.751  0.723  
Tobacco processing industry 1.159  1.101  1.082  0.970  0.974  0.806  0.694  
Textile industry 0.529  0.517  0.506  0.496  0.491  0.476  0.476  
Clothing and other fiber products manufacturing 0.579  0.562  0.542  0.537  0.535  0.532  0.529  
Leather, fur, down and down products industry 0.608  0.629  0.625  0.608  0.604  0.604  0.607  
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products industry 0.597  0.549  0.539  0.516  0.532  0.472  0.486  
Furniture Manufacturing industry 0.672  0.617  0.594  0.610  0.604  0.595  0.594  
Paper and paper products industry 0.580  0.554  0.540  0.527  0.526  0.527  0.530  
Printing and Record Medium Reproduction industry 0.814  0.769  0.751  0.718  0.678  0.653  0.619  
Educational and Sports Goods industry 0.543  0.555  0.541  0.543  0.557  0.535  0.543  
Petroleum processing and coking industry 0.708  0.684  0.665  0.657  0.710  0.713  0.751  
Chemical materials and chemical products manufacturing industry 0.655  0.606  0.582  0.557  0.556  0.532  0.521  
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing industry 0.638  0.614  0.606  0.616  0.649  0.616  0.607  
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers industry 0.821  0.772  0.781  0.721  0.696  0.640  0.673  
Rubber product industry 0.575  0.570  0.603  0.573  0.550  0.540  0.554  
Plastic products industry 0.537  0.512  0.510  0.509  0.516  0.505  0.511  
Non-metallic mineral products industry 0.501  0.481  0.472  0.452  0.457  0.440  0.436  
Ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.635  0.624  0.628  0.643  0.673  0.630  0.627  
Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.692  0.677  0.666  0.664  0.676  0.640  0.623  
Fabricated Metal Products industry 0.593  0.557  0.536  0.529  0.530  0.516  0.517  
General machinery manufacturing industry 0.613  0.595  0.577  0.558  0.560  0.543  0.530  
Special equipment manufacturing industry 0.534  0.516  0.504  0.471  0.467  0.456  0.452  
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing industry 0.688  0.624  0.631  0.623  0.616  0.591  0.589  
Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing 0.659  0.639  0.634  0.636  0.645  0.640  0.637  
Electronic and communication equipment manufacturing industry 0.746  0.702  0.730  0.752  0.730  0.734  0.727  
Instrumentation and culture, office machinery manufacturing industry 0.678  0.653  0.623  0.613  0.644  0.621  0.641  
Other manufacturing industry 0.523  0.524  0.507  0.546  0.545  0.514  0.534  
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Table A3(b). Import penetration ratio in 2-digit Chinese industrial sectors (2000-06) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Food processing industry 0.075 0.066 0.068 0.075 0.076 0.056 0.052 
Food Manufacturing industry 0.037 0.040 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.025 0.023 
Beverage Manufacturing industry 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 
Tobacco processing industry 0.015 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.019 0.022 
Textile industry 0.126 0.123 0.101 0.092 0.075 0.061 0.049 
Clothing and other fiber products manufacturing 0.049 0.046 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.030 0.026 
Leather, fur, down and down products industry 0.079 0.066 0.072 0.064 0.068 0.049 0.043 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products industry 0.129 0.087 0.086 0.090 0.070 0.048 0.031 
Furniture Manufacturing industry 0.060 0.075 0.076 0.104 0.099 0.069 0.058 
Paper and paper products industry 0.173 0.157 0.144 0.133 0.11 0.088 0.073 
Printing and Record Medium Reproduction industry 0.032 0.033 0.029 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.024 
Educational and Sports Goods industry 0.290 0.312 0.339 0.348 0.371 0.359 0.325 
Petroleum processing and coking industry 0.033 0.03 0.138 0.148 0.161 0.158 0.184 
Chemical materials and chemical products manufacturing industry 0.317 0.331 0.317 0.324 0.319 0.297 0.271 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing industry 0.061 0.073 0.068 0.070 0.072 0.068 0.065 
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers industry 0.153 0.164 0.158 0.143 0.127 0.102 0.072 
Rubber product industry 0.076 0.084 0.076 0.102 0.103 0.094 0.111 
Plastic products industry 0.131 0.126 0.120 0.128 0.126 0.125 0.115 
Non-metallic mineral products industry 0.045 0.046 0.043 0.043 0.041 0.035 0.030 
Ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.131 0.129 0.143 0.148 0.116 0.111 0.088 
Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.225 0.227 0.209 0.216 0.193 0.193 0.160 
Fabricated Metal Products industry 0.132 0.135 0.134 0.134 0.145 0.123 0.114 
General machinery manufacturing industry 0.353 0.377 0.362 0.373 0.355 0.313 0.283 
Special equipment manufacturing industry 0.371 0.452 0.421 0.426 0.404 0.368 0.329 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing industry 0.114 0.177 0.142 0.171 0.15 0.145 0.172 
Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing 0.464 0.511 0.607 0.686 0.858 0.903 1.079 
Electronic and communication equipment manufacturing industry 0.494 0.555 0.573 0.702 0.746 0.737 0.705 
Instrumentation and culture, office machinery manufacturing industry 0.152 0.148 0.122 0.113 0.114 0.090 0.075 
Other manufacturing industry 0.672 0.782 0.733 0.830 0.693 0.678 0.646 
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Online Appendix 4. Full results: various heterogeneous effects on how imports affect 
productivity dispersion 
 
Table A4(a). Heterogeneous effect: the role of trade regimes 
 
 Dispersion Measure IQ Range Standard Deviation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PT-IMP -0.012  -0.574* -0.009  -0.420*** 
 (0.010)  (0.340) (0.007)  (0.151) 
OT-IMP  -6.555*** -4.549*  -2.244** -2.374** 
  (2.293) (2.453)  (0.931) (0.914) 
VALUELB -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADV 0.008*** -0.004 -0.005 0.006*** 0.003 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fixed Cost -0.028 -0.135*** -0.181*** 0.007 -0.030 -0.063*** 
 (0.019) (0.048) (0.044) (0.010) (0.020) (0.022) 
Sunk Cost -0.197*** 0.359 0.189 -0.074*** 0.114 -0.010 
 (0.029) (0.222) (0.224) (0.015) (0.088) (0.081) 
SOE 0.195*** 0.256*** 0.234*** 0.148*** 0.167*** 0.151*** 
 (0.012) (0.031) (0.030) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) 
FIE 0.088*** 0.004 0.068 0.037*** 0.007 0.054*** 
 (0.013) (0.036) (0.051) (0.007) (0.014) (0.020) 
HHI 0.294*** 0.430*** 0.390*** 0.300*** 0.346*** 0.317*** 
 (0.014) (0.052) (0.053) (0.007) (0.021) (0.020) 
Subsidy 0.174 1.098* 1.004** 0.243*** 0.552** 0.483*** 
 (0.121) (0.596) (0.487) (0.076) (0.248) (0.185) 
Under-identification test  6.962 
c 19.857 a 7.707 a 6.962 c 19.857 a 7.707 a 
Weak identification test 1.791 16.603 b 2.543  1.791  16.603 a 2.543  
Durbin Wu-Hausman test 3.909
 b
 20.669 
a
 12.076 
a
 7.991
 a
 8.679
 a
 7.725
 a
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.132 0.129 0.133 0.182 0.193 0.199 
Observation 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The under-identification test is based 
on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, with a null hypothesis that the model is under-identified; the weak 
identification test is based on the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with a null hypothesis that the first stage 
regression is weakly identified; and the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is based on the F statistics, 
with the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous; the superscripts 
a
 
b
 and 
c
 are used to indicate that the p-value of the test statistics is below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively, suggesting that 
the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected. All province, year, and industry fixed effects are included but not 
reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A4(b). Heterogeneous effect: the nature of imported goods 
Dispersion Measure IQ Range Standard Deviation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FIN-IMP -0.371***   -0.181***   
 (0.077)   (0.040)   
IN-IMP  -0.554***   -0.283***  
  (0.137)   (0.071)  
UP-IMP   5.522***   2.242** 
   (2.072)   (0.896) 
VALUELB  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADV 0.003 0.003 0.019*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Fixed Cost  -0.157*** -0.106*** 0.092 -0.056*** -0.033** 0.056** 
 (0.031) (0.026) (0.057) (0.016) (0.014) (0.025) 
Sunk Cost -0.167*** -0.200*** -0.155** -0.060*** -0.076*** -0.059** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.067) (0.017) (0.018) (0.029) 
SOE 0.206*** 0.188*** 0.196*** 0.152*** 0.143*** 0.147*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
FIE 0.091*** 0.125*** -0.101 0.037*** 0.055*** -0.041 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.073) (0.006) (0.008) (0.032) 
HHI 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.232*** 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.274*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.034) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015) 
Subsidy 0.237* 0.191 -0.163 0.268*** 0.247*** 0.100 
 (0.131) (0.143) (0.297) (0.069) (0.075) (0.129) 
Under-identification test 588.756 
a
 297.618 
a
 24.879 
a
 588.756 
a
 297.618 
a
 24.879 
a
 
Weak identification test 230.368 
a
 111.229 
a
 8.332 230.368 
a
 111.229 
a
 8.332 
Durbin Wu-Hausman test 20.731 
a
 20.008 
a
 32.574 
a
 13.52 
a
 17.546 
a
 18.882 
a
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.101 0.105 0.111 0.124 0.119 0.125 
Observation 16985 16985 16984 16985 16985 16984 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
under-identification test is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, with a null hypothesis 
that the model is under-identified; the weak identification test is based on the Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic, with a null hypothesis that the first stage regression is weakly identified; and the 
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is based on the F statistics, with the null hypothesis 
that the endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous; the superscripts 
a
 
b
 and 
c
 are 
used to indicate that the p-value of the test statistics is below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively, 
suggesting that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected. All province, year, and industry 
fixed effects are included but not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Online Appendix 5. Full results: further robustness tests 
 
Table A5(a). The weighted regression method 
Dispersion Measure 
IQ Range Standard Deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IMP -0.298*** -0.288*** -0.316*** -0.320*** -0.162*** -0.192*** -0.180*** -0.185*** 
 (0.095) (0.076) (0.090) (0.090) (0.056) (0.053) (0.048) (0.048) 
VALUELB  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADV 0.005** 0.004** 0.002 0.002 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Cost  -0.132*** -0.162*** -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.065*** -0.077*** -0.034* -0.035** 
 (0.036) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Sunk Cost -0.244*** -0.221*** -0.215*** -0.214*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.083*** -0.083*** 
 (0.044) (0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) 
SOE  0.235*** 0.221*** 0.220***  0.196*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
FIE  0.086*** 0.081*** 0.081***  0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
  (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
HHI   0.298*** 0.298***   0.325*** 0.325*** 
   (0.017) (0.017)   (0.009) (0.009) 
Subsidy    0.215    0.243*** 
    (0.137)    (0.077) 
Under-identification test  728.678 
a 
712.990 
a 
710.401 
a 
703.147 
a 
728.678 
a 
712.990
a 
710.401
a 
703.147
a 
Weak identification test 282.000
 a
 280.469 
a
 280.186
 a
 277.110
 a
 282.000
 a
 176.202
 a
 280.186
 a
 277.110
a
 
Durbin Wu-Hausman F test 6.320
 b
 8.851
 b
 9.641
 b
 10.030
 b
 3.838
 b
 2.940
 c
 3.872
 b
 4.502
 b
 
Adj-R
2
 0.034 0.084 0.107 0.106 0.055 0.130 0.251 0.250 
Observation 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The under-identification test is 
based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, with a null hypothesis that the model is under-identified; the 
weak identification test is based on the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with a null hypothesis that the first 
stage regression is weakly identified; and the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is based on the F 
statistics, with the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous; the 
superscripts 
a
 
b
 and 
c
 are used to indicate that the p-value of the test statistics is below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
respectively, suggesting that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected. All province, year, and industry 
fixed effects are included but not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A5(b). The effect of import competition of neighbouring province on TFP dispersion 
Dispersion Measure 
IQ Range Standard Deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IMP -0.247*** -0.291*** -0.297*** -0.302*** -0.089* -0.132*** -0.138*** -0.145*** 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) (0.046) (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) 
Neighbour-IMP 0.027 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
VALUELB  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADV 0.007*** 0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Cost  -0.152*** -0.163*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.065*** -0.080*** -0.037** -0.038** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Sunk Cost -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.191*** -0.190*** -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.073*** -0.072*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
SOE  0.235*** 0.204*** 0.204***  0.183*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FIE  0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086***  0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
HHI   0.297*** 0.297***   0.301*** 0.301*** 
   (0.014) (0.014)   (0.007) (0.007) 
Subsidy    0.209*    0.254*** 
    (0.124)    (0.077) 
Under-identification test  724.371 
a 
708.776 
a 
706.208 
a 
699.005 
a 
724.371 
a 
708.776
a 
706.208
a 
699.005
a 
Weak identification test 280.096
 a
 278.588 
a
 278.302
 a
 275.249
 a
 280.096
 a
 278.588
 a
 278.302
 a
 275.249
a
 
Durbin Wu-Hausman F test 6.467
 b
 8.975
 a
 9.730
 a
 10.122
 a
 0.875
 
 2.972
 c
 3.861
 b
 4.490
 b
 
Adj-R
2
 0.051 0.083 0.116 0.115 0.082 0.149 0.256 0.255 
Observation 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The under-identification test is 
based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, with a null hypothesis that the model is under-identified; the 
weak identification test is based on the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with a null hypothesis that the first 
stage regression is weakly identified; and the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is based on the F 
statistics, with the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous; the 
superscripts 
a
 
b
 and 
c
 are used to indicate that the p-value of the test statistics is below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
respectively, suggesting that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected. All province, year, and industry 
fixed effects are included but not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A5(c). An alternative productivity measure based on Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
Dispersion Measure 
IQ Range Standard Deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IMP -0.359*** -0.382*** -0.390*** -0.393*** -0.205*** -0.223*** -0.230*** -0.234*** 
 (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
VALUELB  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADV 0.003* 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Cost  -0.199*** -0.206*** -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.125*** -0.130*** -0.092*** -0.093*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Sunk Cost -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
SOE  0.102*** 0.074*** 0.073***  0.066*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FIE  0.030** 0.029** 0.030**  0.014* 0.013* 0.013* 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
HHI   0.271*** 0.271***   0.275*** 0.275*** 
   (0.014) (0.014)   (0.008) (0.008) 
Subsidy    0.120    0.144 
    (0.235)    (0.178) 
Under-identification test  728.678 
a 
712.990 
a 
710.401 
a 
703.147 
a 
728.678 
a 
712.990
a 
710.401
a 
703.147
a 
Weak identification test 282.000
 a
 280.469 
a
 280.186
 a
 277.110
 a
 282.000
 a
 176.202
 a
 280.186
 a
 277.110
a
 
Durbin Wu-Hausman F test 18.563
 a
 20.875
 a
 22.287
 a
 22.286
 a
 16.283
 a
 19.175
 a
 23.071
 a
 23.553
 a
 
Adj-R
2
 0.013 0.014 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.046 0.132 0.131 
Observation 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The under-identification test is 
based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, with a null hypothesis that the model is under-identified; the 
weak identification test is based on the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with a null hypothesis that the first 
stage regression is weakly identified; and the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is based on the F 
statistics, with the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous; the 
superscripts 
a
 
b
 and 
c
 are used to indicate that the p-value of the test statistics is below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
respectively, suggesting that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected. All province, year, and industry 
fixed effects are included but not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A5(d). An alternative productivity measure based on Woodridge (2009) 
Dispersion Measure 
IQ Range Standard Deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IMP -0.521*** -0.544*** -0.554*** -0.553*** -0.205*** -0.223*** -0.230*** -0.234*** 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.089) (0.090) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
VALUELB  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADV -0.004 -0.005* -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.002* 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Cost  -0.258*** -0.265*** -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.125*** -0.130*** -0.092*** -0.093*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Sunk Cost -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
SOE  0.094*** 0.058*** 0.058***  0.066*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FIE  0.027 0.026 0.026  0.014* 0.013* 0.013* 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
HHI   0.349*** 0.349***   0.275*** 0.275*** 
   (0.019) (0.019)   (0.008) (0.008) 
Subsidy    -0.016    0.144 
    (0.255)    (0.178) 
Under-identification test  728.678 
a 
712.990 
a 
710.401 
a 
703.147 
a 
728.678 
a 
712.990
a 
710.401
a 
703.147
a 
Weak identification test 282.000
 a
 280.469 
a
 280.186
 a
 277.110
 a
 282.000
 a
 176.202
 a
 280.186
 a
 277.110
a
 
Durbin Wu-Hausman F test 31.471
 a
 33.567
 a
 35.681
 a
 35.339
 a
 16.284
 a
 19.175
 a
 23.071
 a
 23.553
 a
 
Adj-R
2
 0.007 0.005 0.034 0.034 0.044 0.046 0.132 0.131 
Observation 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The under-identification test is 
based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, with a null hypothesis that the model is under-identified; the 
weak identification test is based on the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with a null hypothesis that the first 
stage regression is weakly identified; and the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is based on the F 
statistics, with the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous; the 
superscripts 
a
 
b
 and 
c
 are used to indicate that the p-value of the test statistics is below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
respectively, suggesting that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected. All province, year, and industry 
fixed effects are included but not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A5(e). An alternative productivity measure based on system GMM 
Dispersion Measure 
IQ Range Standard Deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IMP -0.359*** -0.790*** -0.798*** -0.803*** -0.205*** -0.223*** -0.230*** -0.234*** 
 (0.070) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
VALUELB  -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADV 0.003* -0.003 -0.005** -0.005** 0.002* 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Cost  -0.199*** -0.377*** -0.328*** -0.329*** -0.125*** -0.130*** -0.092*** -0.093*** 
 (0.027) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Sunk Cost -0.127*** -0.190*** -0.155*** -0.154*** -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
SOE  0.099*** 0.064*** 0.063***  0.066*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FIE  0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046***  0.014* 0.013* 0.013* 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
HHI   0.347*** 0.347***   0.275*** 0.275*** 
   (0.019) (0.019)   (0.008) (0.008) 
Subsidy    0.202    0.144 
    (0.283)    (0.178) 
Under-identification test  728.678 
a 712.990 a 710.401 a 703.147 a 728.678 a 712.990a 710.401a 703.147a 
Weak identification test 282.000
 a 280.469 a 280.186 a 277.110 a 282.000 a 176.202 a 280.186 a 277.110a 
Durbin Wu-Hausman F test 18.562
 a 68.752 a 72.683 a 73.091 a 16.284a 19.175 a 23.071 a 23.553 a 
Adj-R2 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.044 0.046 0.132 0.131 
Observation 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 16985 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The under-identification test is 
based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, with a null hypothesis that the model is under-identified; the 
weak identification test is based on the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with a null hypothesis that the first 
stage regression is weakly identified; and the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity is based on the F 
statistics, with the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors in the model are in fact exogenous; the 
superscripts 
a
 
b
 and 
c
 are used to indicate that the p-value of the test statistics is below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
respectively, suggesting that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected. All province, year, and industry 
fixed effects are included but not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Online Appendix 6. Summary statistics of variables in various heterogeneous effects, 
channels and further robustness tests 
 
 Observatio
n 
Province* Industry Mean Std. 
Error 
Min  Max 
Heterogeneous effect: the role of trade regime 
PT-IMP 16985 30 425 0.046  0.127  0.000  0.732  
OT-IMP 16985 30 425 0.010  0.045  0.000  0.325  
Heterogeneous effect: the nature of imported goods 
Fin-Import 16985 30 425 0.085  0.165  0.000  0.787  
SAME-Import 16985 30 425 0.066  0.145  0.000  0.770  
Up-Import 16985 30 425 0.013  0.036  0.000  0.233  
Channels: firm exit or convergence? 
TFP 1284653 30 425 2.897  0.909  -0.715  9.101  
Size 1284653 30 425 4.726  1.176  0.000  11.903  
  Age 1284653 30 425 1.871  0.991  0.000  5.603  
Further robustness test: the effect of neighbouring province 
Neighbour-IMP 16985 30 425 0.055  6.361  0.000 0.791  
Further robustness test: alternative measure of productivity dispersion based on Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) 
  IQ Range 16985 30 425 0.567  0.212  0.162  1.307  
  Standard deviation 16985 30 425 0.432  0.133  0.141  0.793  
Further robustness test: alternative measure of productivity dispersion based on Wooldridge (2009) 
  IQ Range 16985 30 425 0.612  0.241  0.181  1.543  
  Standard deviation 16985 30 425 0.447  0.135  0.183  0.882  
Further robustness test: alternative measure of productivity dispersion based on System GMM 
  IQ Range 16985 30 425 0.641  0.246  0.198  1.590  
  Standard deviation 16985 30 425 0.445  0.141  0.154  0.763  
* We do not include Tibet in our empirical estimation due to the data coverage in both NBS and Customs data. 
 
 
 
